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Trade Growth, Production
Fragmentation, and
China’s Environment
Judith M. Dean and Mary E. Lovely

11.1

Introduction

China often receives attention both for its rapidly growing trade and its
serious environmental degradation. China’s trade with the world has risen
dramatically between 1995 and 2005. In current dollars, the value of China’s
exports plus imports rose from $280.9 billion in 1995 to $1422.1 billion in
2005—a growth of about 406 percent. While improvements have been made
in water and air quality over the same period, China’s Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) stated that “[t]he conflict between environment
and development is becoming ever more prominent. Relative shortage of
resources, a fragile ecological environment and insuﬃcient environmental
capacity are becoming critical problems hindering China’s development”
(MEP 2006).
Judith M. Dean is a senior international economist at the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC). Mary E. Lovely is associate professor of economics at Syracuse University’s
Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Aﬀairs.
We thank Ming-Sun Poon (Library of Congress), Cliﬀord Brown, Wendy Willis, and Robert
Bauschspies (USITC Library) for their help in obtaining Chinese environmental data. We are
also indebted to Andrew Gately (USITC) for translating tables from Chinese, and Russell
Husen and Jesse Mora for assistance assembling data and generating graphs and tables. This
chapter benefited from comments by Carol McAusland; Brent Haddad; and the participants
in the University of Maryland, Department of Agriculture and Resource Economics seminar
(2007); the University of California, Santa Cruz, International Economics Trade and Environment workshop (2007); the Midwest International Trade Meetings, University of Minnesota
(2007); and the School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University Economics seminar. We are also grateful to Robert Feenstra, Arik Levinson, and the other participants
in the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Conference on China’s Growing Role
in World Trade for helpful comments on a preliminary draft. The views expressed here are those
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the USITC or the views of any
of the individual Commissioners.
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Some of the large literature on trade and environment lends credence
to the idea that trade growth and environmental degradation are causally
related. The environmental Kuznets curve literature suggests that low-income
countries have relatively lenient environmental standards and, hence, a comparative advantage in pollution-intensive goods.1 As a low-income country
grows, environmental damage increases due to increased scale of production and a composition of output biased toward “dirty goods.” However,
higher incomes also generate pressure for more stringent environmental
regulations. Because tighter regulations raise the cost of polluting and give
producers incentives to find cleaner production techniques, this tends to
reduce environmental damage.2 For low-income countries, the scale and
composition eﬀects are thought to outweigh the technique eﬀect, implying
that the net eﬀect of growth is detrimental to the environment. Because
trade growth raises incomes, it, too, contributes to these scale, composition,
and technique eﬀects. Yet empirical evidence on the net eﬀect of trade and
environmental damage is mixed, with at least some studies (Dean 2002;
Antweiler, Copeland, and Taylor 2001) finding evidence that the technique
eﬀect may be stronger than previously thought, leading to a net beneficial
impact of trade growth on the environment.
China’s integration with the world economy may not fit this conventional
picture. Much of China’s trade growth is attributable to the international fragmentation of production—the splitting of production processes into discrete
sequential activities (fragments) that take place in diﬀerent countries3 (Chen
et al. 2008; Ping 2005; Dean, Fung, and Wang 2008). China’s trade statistics
explicitly designate “processing imports” as imports of intermediate inputs
to be used to produce products solely for export and “processing exports” as
those exports that use these imported inputs.4 This trade alone accounts for
about 56 percent of the growth in China’s exports and 41 percent of the growth
in China’s imports between 1995 and 2005. In addition, a large part of this
trade is attributable to foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs).5 In 2005, about 84
percent of China’s processing exports and imports were carried out by FIEs.
1. The evidence on the existence of an environmental Kuznets curve is mixed and highly
dependent upon time period, countries evaluated, and pollutants examined. Thus, there is no
way to verify whether or not China is to the left or right of the turning point in the “inverted
U.” For surveys covering the broader literature on trade and environment, see Dean (2001) and
Copeland and Taylor (2004).
2. In addition, some would argue that increased FDI would imply greater environmental
degradation, as firms in pollution-intensive industries may move to avoid more stringent environmental regulations at home. See Dean, Lovely, and Wang (2009) for review of evidence and
counterargument.
3. See Arndt and Kierzkowski (2001) for discussion of the causes of fragmentation.
4. Chinese trade statistics record two types of processing imports and exports: processing
and assembly (where the foreigner retains ownership of imported inputs) and processing with
imported inputs (where the importer acquires ownership of imported inputs).
5. Chinese trade statistics record several types of FIEs: fully-funded enterprises (i.e., wholly
owned subsidiaries of foreign companies), equity joint ventures, and contractual joint ventures.
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Trade arising from international production fragmentation could be
cleaner than conventional trade. If highly fragmented industries (such as
computers and other high-tech products) and the particular fragments within
these products that China produces are relatively clean, then China’s output
and trade would shift toward cleaner goods as these activities expand. In
addition, if the FIEs who carry out much of this trade in fragments produce
using greener technologies than those used by domestic producers in China,
production techniques within fragmented industries would become cleaner
over time. In this way, both the composition and technique eﬀects of trade
growth may be favorable to China’s environment.
This chapter explores these relationships using new evidence on the pollution content of Chinese trade. We first present evidence on the growth of
trade and industrial emissions in China. Using oﬃcial Chinese environmental data on air and water pollution from MEP, we find that industrial emissions of primary pollutants have slowed or fallen over the last decade while
trade has grown. Across most industrial sectors, the pollution intensity of
production has also fallen. We then explore trends in the pollution intensity
of Chinese trade. Building on highly disaggregated trade data from China
Customs, we report new evidence that the pollution intensity of Chinese
exports has fallen dramatically from 1995 to 2004. We use a counterfactual
exercise to show that this decrease in the pollution intensity of trade is due
partly to a shift in the composition of trade toward cleaner goods, but also
to a shift in production technique toward cleaner processes.
Finally, we explore the possibility that production fragmentation and processing trade may have played a role in making China’s trade cleaner. Building on the framework provided by Copeland and Taylor (1994), we develop
a reduced form model of the pollution intensity of trade, incorporating
standard determinants of a country’s production mix, such as factor proportions, income per capita, and trade policy. We then incorporate a fragmented
export sector, building upon the work of Feenstra and Hanson (1996). The
impact of fragmentation on the pollution intensity of China’s exports and
imports is estimated using data on four pollutants over a ten-year period. We
find evidence consistent with the view that the increased role of processing
trade and the extensive presence of FIEs have both contributed to reducing
the pollution intensity of China’s trade.
11.2
11.2.1

An Overview of China’s Environmental Quality and Regulation
Environmental Quality

Descriptions of China invite superlatives, and this is certainly true of
China’s environmental problems. There are almost daily media reports of
rivers and lakes poisoned by pollution and algal bloom, water tables dropping too low to meet basic needs, farmlands tainted by industrial pollution
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and fertilizers, and cities choking on smog.6 With economic growth forecasts exceeding 10 percent, the associated growth in industrial and municipal
wastes, vehicle emissions, agricultural runoﬀ, and deforestation have led
observers to doubt the sustainability of China’s development path. Indeed,
as Naughton (2007, 503) notes, “The challenges of water availability, resilience of the natural environment, and atmospheric degradation and climate
change are among the most serious that China confronts.”
China’s environmental problems are not the result of current emissions
alone. The accumulation of past pollution; the ability of the air, land, and
water to refresh itself; and changes in settlement patterns are all reflected in
today’s environment. Even if all economic activity were halted today, China
would face serious “pollution problems” for years to come. When thinking
about the eﬀect of economic activity on the environment, therefore, it is
important to distinguish between emissions, the “flow” of pollutants into
the environment, and ambient quality, the “stock” of pollutants present at
a specific point in time. Our analysis focuses on the former, while most news
reports focus on the latter.
To put our discussion of trade and emissions (flows) into perspective, it is
useful to review briefly trends in China’s ambient quality (stocks). Despite
widespread awareness of China’s recurrent environmental crises, it is diﬃcult
to obtain consistent evidence on environmental quality. Repeated measures
of ambient quality are available only through MEP, and even oﬃcial reports
reflect changing measurement methods and definitions over time, as China’s environmental regulation and monitoring capability have improved.
The data used in this study are drawn from oﬃcial Chinese sources. There
are many problems with oﬃcial Chinese data, and environmental statistics
are no exception. Nevertheless, there is no alternative set of data available.
Moreover, these data provide systematic information to an area of research
often dominated by anecdote.
Figure 11.1 provides summary data on the trend in water quality for
China’s seven major rivers drawn from MEP’s annual State of the Environment reports. From 2001 to 2005, there has been some improvement in
water quality. The percentage of monitoring sections of the seven major
rivers meeting a grade III quality standard or better rose from 30 percent
to 40 percent, while the percentage considered to be highly polluted (grade
V or worse than grade V) fell from 53 percent to 34 percent. These data
suggest that China has succeeded in raising the quality of its extremely
polluted water to a more moderately polluted level, but has made little
progress in raising much of its water to the higher grade standards. These
summary measures, though, hide substantial variation in water quality in
6. An excellent and informative example is the New York Times series, Choking on Growth,
which reports on many aspects of China’s environmental challenge. See http://www.nytimes
.com/2007/08/26/world/asia/26china.html.
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Water quality: Seven major rivers

Source: Data from MEP, Report on the State of the Environment, various years. http://english
.mep.gov.cn/standards_reports/soe.
Note: Comparable data for earlier years are unavailable.

diﬀerent segments of the rivers and in their tributaries. For example, the
mainstream of the Yellow River is considered to be only lightly polluted,
while most of its tributaries are heavily polluted (MEP 2007). Freshwater
lakes and reservoirs remain heavily polluted. In 2006, 48 percent of major
lakes and reservoirs were listed as worse than grade V, implying that they
are heavily polluted (MEP 2007). The most ubiquitous pollutant is readily
degradable organic materials from industry and households, with industry’s share of these pollutants falling from 50 percent to 38 percent by 2005
(MEP 2007).
National survey data summarized by the World Bank (2001) suggest that
total emissions of major air pollutants (SO2, soot, and dust) peaked in the
mid 1990s. As shown in figure 11.2, MEP reports that urban air quality
continued to improve between 2000 and 2005. The percentage of cities with
air quality rated grade II (up to standard) or better rose from 37 percent
to 52 percent during this period. Again, there are indications that most of
China’s progress has been in reducing the extent of severe air pollution, as
the percentage of cities with air quality worse than grade III fell from 33
percent to 11 percent. Particulates are considered the most important pollutant aﬀecting urban air quality, both in terms of frequency and health costs.
Particulate emissions are heaviest in China’s largest cities, including Beijing
and Tianjin, due in part to the rapid growth of motor vehicle emissions in
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Fig. 11.2

Urban air quality

Source: Data from MEP, Report on the State of the Environment, various years. http://english
.mep.gov.cn/standards_reports/soe/soe2006/200711/t2007/1105_112560.htm.
Note: Comparable data for earlier years are unavailable.

these areas. More than 80 percent of SO2 and dust and most soot is attributed to industrial sources, which include coal-fired power plants.
11.2.2

Environmental Regulation and Policy

The Chinese government has long recognized the need for environmental
protection. In 1989, a legislative base for environment protection was created
by promulgation of the Environmental Protection Law. This law authorized
the Environmental Protection Bureau of the State Council to set ambient
standards and waste discharge and emission standards. In 1984, the bureau
gained administrative independence as a separate oﬃce and its oﬃce staﬀ
size doubled. The bureau was renamed the National Environmental Protection Agency (NEPA) four years later, its staﬀ size again doubled, and it was
given direct links to the State Council. In recognition of the increasing importance placed upon environment in the overall development plan, NEPA was
renamed the State Environmental Protection Agency and given ministerial
rank in 1998. Despite this rank, SEPA did not have a seat in the State Council
and remained less powerful than some other key ministries (OECD 2005),
until it became the Ministry of Environmental Protection in 2008. It is considered to be underfunded and undermanned for the large portfolio it oversees.
The Ministry of Environmental Protection is responsible for developing
policies and programs at the national level. In each province, Environmental
Protection Bureaus (EPBs) oversee compliance with national and local envi-
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ronmental regulations. These local bureaus report to provincial administrators, which also oversee their funding. Recently, MEP has acquired some say
in the selection of provincial EPB heads. The EPBs also exist at the prefecture, or municipal, and district or county levels. The EPBs report directly to
upper-level environmental administrators as well as to the government of a
geographic area. This reporting system is often cited as a source of conflict
for local EPBs who may face interference from local leaders. Lower-level
EPBs report to higher level EPBs, but the funding and supervision are provided by the province or lower-level administration (OECD 2005).
China has a well-developed regulatory system with over 2,000 laws related
to environmental protection. During the 1990s, China gave increasing
emphasis to prevention and shifted responsibility to polluters to pay for
environmental damage. A key policy instrument in this shift was the introduction of a discharge fee system, with fees based on the concentration of
eﬄuents. These fees are applied to industrial emissions across China, with
most revenue accruing from fees for discharges of wastewater and waste
gases. This system has been criticized on a number of dimensions. It is widely
believed that the fees are only a fraction of the social cost of pollution and
that the fees do not encourage abatement. Local EPBs can also issue permits
that limit the quantities and concentrations of pollutants in an enterprise’s
emissions, set deadlines for pollution control, and close plants deemed
dependent on “backward” technology.
More recently, the criminal code has been revised to provide for criminal
sanctions for egregious harm to the environment (OECD 2005). Environmental impact assessment has become routine for major economic projects
and MEP and EPBs can suspend or delay projects that do not meet environmental standards. In 1992, the Chinese government removed a number
of sectoral and regional restrictions on foreign direct investment (FDI) and
decentralized approval (Lardy 1994). New rules introduced in 1995 prohibit
foreign investment that involves dangerous, polluting, or wasteful processes
(Henley, Kirkpatrick, and Wilde 1999).7
11.3
11.3.1

Trends in Chinese Industrial Emissions and Manufacturing Trade
Aggregate Trends

In this chapter, our interest is in the relationship between China’s trade
and China’s environment, rather than the global environment. Hence, we
focus on the primary pollutants that China uses to evaluate the condition
of its own environment, rather than the greenhouse gases associated with
7. MEP also oversees a substantial program of pollution control, with 1.4 percent of GDP
devoted to this purpose in 2003 (Naughton 2007). They also engage in scientific projects and
international cooperative agreements promoting “leapfrogging” development, among other
activities (MEP 2007).
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global climate change. In the 10th Five-Year Plan (2001–2005), the Chinese
government stated explicit goals for the reduction of its water pollution, as
measured by chemical oxygen demand (COD) and its air pollution, as measured by sulfur dioxide (SO2) and particulate matter, especially that generated by smoke and dust (OECD 2005). Chemical oxygen demand measures
the mass concentration of oxygen consumed by chemical breakdown of
organic and inorganic matter in water.8 Chemical oxygen demand emissions account for the majority of industrial water pollution levies collected
in China during this period. While emissions of other water pollutants are
recorded in more recent years, they are generally positively correlated with
COD. Industrial SO2 emissions include the sulfur dioxide emitted from fuel
burning and from the production processes on the premises of an enterprise.
Industrial smoke (or soot) emissions include smoke emitted from fuel burning on the premises of an enterprise. Industrial dust emissions refer to the
volume of dust suspended in the air and emitted by an enterprise’s production processes.9
Figure 11.3 shows the trends in China’s overall merchandise trade (billions
of US$ [2000]) and industrial emissions (billions of kilos) from 1995 to 2005.
Trade data are Chinese oﬃcial data obtained from China Customs. Industrial emissions data are from the Chinese Environmental Yearbook and China
Statistical Yearbook on Environment (various issues). In Chinese oﬃcial statistics, the industrial sector includes Mining, Manufacturing, and Production and Distribution of Electricity, Gas, and Water.10 Emissions data prior
to 1998 were recorded only for industrial enterprises at the “county level and
above.” After the “Investigation on Sources of Township Industrial Pollution,” published in 1997, it was found that township and village industrial
enterprises (TVIEs) were accounting for a growing percentage of emissions.
Therefore, emissions data include these enterprises from 1998 onward. In
figures 11.3 and 11.4, we have been able to include TVIE emissions for 1995
and for 1997. But the TVIE data are unavailable for 1996, so we treat 1996
as missing (indicated by the dashed lines).
The most remarkable trend in figure 11.3 is the dramatic and rapid increase
in the value of China’s merchandise exports plus imports over the period.
By 2005, trade had increased nearly 300 percent in real terms over its 1995
value. During that same period, industrial emissions were decreasing. This
decline is confirmed in the ten-year environmental review issued by MEP
(2006) and is also noted by the World Trade Organization (WTO; 2006) and
8. China Statistical Yearbook on Environment (2006, 207).
9. China Statistical Yearbook on Environment (2006, 208).
10. Changes in Chinese industrial emissions should be fairly representative of air pollution
emissions because industry accounts for at least 80 percent of SO2, smoke, and dust emissions
throughout the period. Chinese industrial water pollution emissions accounted for 60 percent
of COD emissions at the start of the period. With emissions from households and services
growing in importance, industry’s share fell to only 40 percent by the end of the period.

Fig. 11.3

China’s trade and industrial emissions, 1995–2005

Source: Trade data are from China Customs. Industrial emissions data are from the Chinese
Environment Yearbook and China Statistical Yearbook on Environment (various issues).

Fig. 11.4

The pollution intensity of China’s trade, 1995–2004

Source: Data calculations by authors, as described in the text.
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the OECD (2005). In 2005, annual industrial emissions of COD, smoke, and
dust had declined to 56 percent, 46 percent, and 40 percent, respectively, of
their levels in 1995. In contrast, industrial SO2 emissions rose after 1999 and
were 17.5 percent above 1995 levels by 2005.
11.3.2

Trends in the Composition of China’s Trade

To understand what is driving these aggregate trends, we first examine
trends in the composition of China’s trade. Because data on emissions by
industrial sectors are readily available, but data for agricultural or service
sectors are not, we limit our analysis to manufacturing trade. In 2005, manufacturing trade accounted for 97 percent of Chinese exports and 83 percent
of Chinese imports. Table 11.1 shows the shares of exports and imports in
1995 and 2004, by two-digit International Standard Industrial Classification
(ISIC) sectors in manufacturing. The Chinese trade data were aggregated to
Harmonized System (HS) (six-digit) and then converted to ISIC Revision 3
using the oﬃcial Chinese concordance.
Even at this rather aggregated level, table 11.1 reveals some dramatic shifts
in the sectoral composition of Chinese trade over this time period. In 1995,
textiles and apparel accounted for the largest shares of Chinese exports
to the world. These shares fell by about a third by 2004, while the export
share of oﬃce and computing machinery grew by a factor of five, and that
of communications equipment more than doubled. The largest shares of
Chinese imports in 1995 were attributable to textiles and machinery. These
shares fell by about 70 percent and 40 percent, respectively, by 2004, while
import shares in oﬃce and computing machinery and in communications
equipment more than doubled.
The sectoral shift in the composition of China’s trade is interesting not
only because it is dramatic, but because the same sectors have shown increases
in both export and import shares. This suggests that much growth has taken
place in sectors where production is internationally fragmented, resulting in
two-way trade in “fragments” at varying stages of production. One rough
indicator of the degree to which industries are internationally fragmented is
the share of processing exports (imports) in each sector’s total trade. Textile
and apparel exports had substantial shares of processing exports across
sectors in 1995, which fell somewhat by 2004. In contrast, oﬃce equipment
and computing and communications equipment had extremely high shares
of processing exports in 1995, and these shares remained high in 2004. Similarly, table 11.2 shows a decline in the share of processing imports in textiles
and a contrasting rise in that share in communications equipment imports,
though not in oﬃce and computing machinery imports. This evidence suggests that China’s exports (and, to a lesser extent, imports) have become
more concentrated in highly fragmented sectors and that the degree of fragmentation in some of these sectors has grown over time.

5.5
0.7
13.8
14.2
7.3
1.5
0.6
0.1
1.3
6.8
2.7
2.3
5.2
3.4
4.7
3.5
5.1
7.8
2.9
1.4
1.5
7.9

15 Food products and beverages
16 Tobacco
17 Textiles
18 Wearing apparel
19 Leather shoes
20 Wood
21 Paper
22 Printing
23 Coke and petroleum
24 Chemicals
25 Rubber and plastics
26 Nonmetallic minerals
27 Basic metals
28 Fabricated metals
29 Machinery
30 Oﬃce and computing machinery
31 Electrical machinery
32 Communications equipment
33 Medical, precision, and optical instruments
34 Motor vehicles
35 Transport equipment
36 Furniture and other manufacturing

Source: China Customs and author calculations.
Note: ISIC  International Standard Industrial Classification.
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Share of total
manufacturing
exports

24.4
26.6
32.3
54.4
72.7
14.8
42.3
79.5
26.2
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14.7
56.1
36.9
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94.7
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80.5
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59.6
68.6

1995
31.0
2.9
25.7
31.0
47.0
19.4
59.8
54.3
24.4
25.3
62.7
17.2
27.5
25.5
48.2
95.8
62.4
86.0
76.2
59.8
53.3
59.7

2004

Processing exports
as a share of
manufacturing
exports

Chinese manufacturing exports

The composition of China’s trade, 1995 and 2004 (%)

ISIC Rev. 3 2-digit sector

Table 11.1
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2.5
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2.4
0.0
3.1
0.3
0.8
0.5
1.7
0.0
2.6
14.3
1.7
0.7
8.4
1.3
12.8
6.2
6.0
23.0
8.6
3.3
1.4
0.6

2004

Share of total
manufacturing
imports

45.2
0.3
97.2
96.5
98.6
44.4
66.1
55.0
9.1
53.3
83.0
40.1
52.3
43.2
3.8
66.8
50.7
59.8
42.8
4.2
7.8
72.2

1995

26.2
0.3
90.7
73.0
85.9
59.9
38.2
35.2
2.7
33.3
56.1
48.5
40.1
37.7
7.8
50.3
52.6
71.9
57.0
2.1
4.5
57.4

2004

Processing imports
as a share of
manufacturing
imports

Chinese manufacturing imports

2.62
0.28
1.48
0.63
0.84
3.41
6.89
0.64
2.85
4.17
1.08
10.52
5.33
1.47
0.89
0.34
0.84
0.35
0.33
0.45
0.43
0.55
93.22
2.79

11.47
0.20
1.05
0.61
2.05
5.41
67.36
0.18
0.79
3.19
0.17
0.35
0.81
0.12
0.12
0.08
0.14
0.08
0.12
0.12
0.12
0.37
1.48
12.33

15 Food products and beverages
16 Tobacco
17 Textiles
18 Wearing apparel
19 Leather shoes
20 Wood
21 Paper
22 Printing
23 Coke and petroleum
24 Chemicals
25 Rubber and plastics
26 Nonmetallic minerals
27 Basic metals
28 Fabricated metals
29 Machinery
30 Oﬃce and computing machinery
31 Electrical machinery
32 Communications equipment
33 Medical, precision, and optical instruments
34 Motor vehicles
35 Transport equipment
36 Furniture and other manufacturing
40 Electricity, gas, steam, and hot water supply
41 Collection, purification, and distribution of water

2.06
0.10
0.81
0.35
0.48
4.56
4.66
0.32
1.67
2.29
0.46
6.46
2.10
0.74
0.69
0.22
0.50
0.23
0.16
0.38
0.37
0.50
57.71
1.67

Smoke
0.17
0.03
0.03
0.01
0.04
2.59
0.61
0.00
1.15
0.58
0.05
39.45
4.33
0.18
0.11
0.01
1.23
0.01
0.01
0.10
0.10
0.95
0.47
0.45

Dust
1.59
0.02
0.73
0.44
0.70
0.92
6.95
0.08
0.08
0.67
0.10
0.14
0.12
0.08
0.05
0.03
0.02
0.03
0.05
0.06
0.06
0.12
0.25
2.08

COD
0.59
0.05
0.70
0.35
0.23
1.15
1.86
0.09
0.85
1.13
0.26
4.26
1.26
0.32
0.18
0.03
0.16
0.03
0.08
0.06
0.06
0.28
19.93
0.92

SO2

2004

0.66
0.03
0.27
0.17
0.16
1.38
1.08
0.07
0.58
0.54
0.11
3.24
0.50
0.14
0.12
0.03
0.12
0.03
0.02
0.07
0.07
0.19
6.98
0.34

Smoke

0.04
0.01
0.03
0.02
0.01
0.58
0.07
0.00
0.19
0.16
0.05
14.07
0.90
0.10
0.08
0.01
0.41
0.01
0.00
0.06
0.06
0.34
0.17
0.00

Dust

Source: Chinese Environment Yearbook, China Statistical Yearbook on Environment (various issues), and author calculations.
Notes: Values are in kilos per thousand yuan output in 1995 yuan. COD  chemical oxygen demand; ISIC  International Standard Industrial Classification.
Bold face indicates the three industries with the highest pollution intensity (for each pollutant, 1995 and 2004).

SO2

COD

1995

Pollution intensity of Chinese industrial output, 1995 and 2004

ISIC Rev. 3 2-digit sector

Table 11.2
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Trends in Industrial Pollution Intensity

To see the extent to which changes in production technology could be
impacting emissions, we measure the pollution intensity of production by
industry, from 1995 to 2004. We compiled data on emissions of the four
pollutants at the industry level, as well as current value of output of the
sampled enterprises, from the Chinese Environmental Yearbooks (Chinese
editions). Pollution intensities were then calculated as emissions (kilos) per
thousand yuan output (constant 1995 yuan) for thirty-three Chinese twodigit “divisions,” including thirty manufacturing industries and three utilities, in the Chinese 2002 industrial classification.11 These pollution intensities
are shown in appendix table 11A.1. The appendix also provides a detailed
explanation of these calculations and the treatment of missing or aggregated
data. In table 11.2 we present these average water and air pollution intensities (in kilos per thousand yuan output [constant 1995 yuan]), mapped to
the ISIC two-digit sectors, for 1995 and in 2004.12 Pollution intensities for
manufacturing (ISIC 15–36) and for utilities (ISIC 40–41) are included in the
table.13 In each year, the three sectors with the highest pollution intensities
are shown in bold for each pollutant.14
Of the manufacturing industries, the major source of water pollution is
production of paper and paper products. A few others—food products and
beverages and wood products—show relatively high water pollution intensities, but these are far below that of the paper sector. Most industries show
very low water pollution intensity. With respect to air pollution, nonmetallic
minerals (which include cement) is by far the most SO2-intensive and among
11. We measure pollution intensity as emissions relative to the value of output because the
trade data are also measured in terms of value and our main concern is to measure the pollution
intensity of the trade bundle. For some analyses of industrial pollution intensity, a measure
of emissions per unit of value added might be preferable. We are unable to express pollution
intensity relative to value added because value added data are not available at a suﬃciently
disaggregated level. A comparison of the two measures could reveal important, but unknown,
diﬀerences. Because the emissions data are classified by economic activity, the numerator of
these two measures should be similar as they are not aﬀected by changes in the value of purchased intermediates used in the production process. However, the denominators will diﬀer if
an increase in purchased intermediates increases the value of output, thereby reducing pollution
measured relative to total value but not relative to value added.
12. The oﬃcial Chinese concordance maps the Chinese 2002 industrial classification at the
four-digit level to ISIC Revision 3 at the four-digit level. Though some ISIC two-digit sectors correspond to a single Chinese two-digit “division,” some correspond to either multiple
Chinese divisions or to one division plus several four-digit lines from other divisions. Thus,
the average pollution intensities for the ISIC two-digit sectors in table 11.2 generally represent
a production-weighted average of the pollution intensity of multiple Chinese divisions. The
production weights were constructed using Chinese gross industrial output data at the fourdigit level from http://www.chinadataonline.org. Because not all sample years were available,
weights were constructed using 2004 data.
13. ISIC 37 (recycling activities) is omitted. See appendix for discussion.
14. Because there are fewer ISIC two-digit sectors than Chinese divisions, there is some variation between the highest pollution intensities in table 11.2 and table 11A.1.
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the top three in terms of smoke and dust. The other industries with high
air pollution intensities include basic metals and paper (SO2), paper and
wood (smoke), and wood and basic metals (dust). But again these industries
generally show much lower pollution intensities than nonmetallic minerals.
Most industries, in fact, show very low air pollution intensities. The utilities
as a group are highly polluting. The water utility is second only to paper
production in water pollution intensity. The electricity and gas utilities are
the dirtiest sectors overall in terms of SO2 and smoke.15
Table 11.2 also reveals two interesting trends. The first is that across nearly
all sectors, the pollution intensity of production has fallen over time. This is
true for all four pollutants. Even the water and energy utilities show improvement over the period. Thus, there is some evidence of a shift toward cleaner
industrial production techniques in China. The second trend is that China’s
trade does appear to be shifting toward cleaner sectors over time. Although
trade in 1995 was not concentrated in the highest polluting sectors, textiles and leather products were somewhat high in terms of water pollution
intensity and certainly not the lowest in terms of SO2 and smoke intensity.
Though these industries show cleaner production techniques by 2004, they
remain significantly more polluting than oﬃce and computing machinery
and communications equipment. The latter sectors’ pollution intensities
were low in 1995 and extremely low as of 2004.
The pollution intensities in table 11.2 include direct water and air emissions from production processes within each two-digit sector and indirect air
emissions from fuel burning on enterprise premises. For a complete assessment of indirect emissions, we would ideally use an input-output (IO) table
to capture emissions generated by (a) use of domestically produced intermediates in other two-digit ISIC sectors, and (b) use of energy and water
purchased from utilities. However, two main issues impede such an assessment. First, goods exported under the processing regime use more imported
intermediates—and, therefore, less domestically produced intermediates—
than those exported under the normal regime. Thus, the IO table would
have to distinguish imports of final goods from imports of intermediates
and then distinguish imported intermediates used for processing exports
from those used for normal exports. Second, indirect emissions from fuel
burning on site are already included in our pollution intensities. Thus, IO
coeﬃcients reflecting energy demand would have to be adjusted to net out
on-site supplies.
The oﬃcial Chinese IO table does not address either of these issues. In
recent work, Dean, Fung, and Wang (2008) and Koopman, Wang, and Wei
(2008) provide an improved method for identifying imported intermedi15. The ISIC Revision 3 groups the electricity and fuel gas utilities into ISIC 40, and as a
result, the dust intensity for ISIC 40 looks quite low. But fuel gas production and supply has
the second highest dust intensity across Chinese divisions.
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ates and for splitting the Chinese IO table between processing exports and
normal exports for 123 sectors for 1997 and 2002.16 In theory, this could
be used to address the first issue discussed above for two years in our sample.
However, because no separate data exist for the use of domestic intermediates in processing and normal exports (including energy and water),
diﬀerences only emerge after rebalancing. There appear to be no data available to address the second issue. This is a critical drawback to any calculation of indirect emissions because this could lead to double-counting with
respect to emissions from energy use, and table 11.2 shows that Chinese
utilities are highly polluting industries. Therefore, in the present analysis, we
use the pollution intensities in table 11.2 to assess changes in the pollution
intensity of Chinese trade.
11.4

The Pollution Intensity of Chinese Trade

If the popular wisdom were correct, we would expect China’s continuing
trade liberalization, particularly after its 2001 WTO accession, to lead to
increased specialization in “dirty goods” (Gardner 2008). This composition eﬀect, along with increased scale of production, would be expected to
worsen emissions and lead to “dirtier” trade than in earlier years (ceteris
paribus). However, thus far we have presented at least superficial evidence
that trade has shifted toward cleaner industries and that industrial production has become cleaner over time. In addition, this evidence suggests that
production fragmentation may have played a role in these trends. In the
evidence we present below, we find:
• Chinese exports are less water-pollution intensive and generally less
air-pollution intensive than Chinese imports.
• Both Chinese exports and imports are becoming cleaner over time.
• The cleaner trends in exports and imports are driven by both composition and technique eﬀects, with the latter being the strongest.
• Processing trade is indeed cleaner than ordinary trade.
To measure the pollution intensity of Chinese trade, we bring together
the Chinese manufacturing pollution intensities discussed earlier and the
Chinese trade data. Early studies of the pollution intensity of U.S. trade
(Walter 1973; Robison 1988) did not have industrial emissions data so had to
rely on estimates of environmental control costs (e.g., abatement capital and
operating costs and research and development [R&D]) to calculate pollution intensity by industry. More recently, Ederington, Levinson, and Minier
(2004) made use of U.S. industrial emissions data for a single year, and
changes in the composition of exports and imports over time, to construct
16. Both papers include discussion of advances over earlier analyses by Chen et al. (2008)
and Ping (2005).
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changes in the pollution intensity of U.S. exports and imports. While this
was a significant advance, the lack of time series emissions data confined
the observed changes over time to composition eﬀects. In a recent paper,
Levinson (2009) uses several years of U.S. industrial emissions data to discern the relative importance of composition and technique eﬀects in the
pollution intensity of U.S. trade.
Here we use the annual Chinese pollution intensities across industries and
annual trade data to calculate an export- or import-weighted average pollution intensity for aggregate exports (imports) for each of the eleven years
in the sample (1995–2004). Using the oﬃcial Chinese concordance, we map
the Chinese pollution intensity for each Chinese division to the four-digit
ISIC lines corresponding to that division.17 This pollution intensity is then
weighted by the share of manufacturing exports (imports) corresponding
to that four-digit ISIC line, and summed to yield an export- or importweighted average pollution intensity for each year.
Figure 11.4 shows that both exports and imports became steadily cleaner
throughout the period. By 2004, the water pollution intensity of exports had
fallen by about 84 percent, while that of imports had fallen by 89 percent,
compared to 1995 levels. The drop in air pollution intensity was almost as
dramatic, with export (import) SO2 intensity falling by 75 percent (78 percent), smoke intensity by 75 percent (80 percent), and dust intensity by 73
percent (74 percent).18 Interestingly, both Ederington, Levinson, and Minier
(2004) and Levinson (2009) find evidence that U.S. exports and imports also
have become cleaner over time.
Chinese exports also appear to be much cleaner than Chinese imports. In
1995, had Chinese imports been produced in China, they would have generated about 70 percent more COD emissions per thousand yuan than Chinese
exports. This diﬀerence diminishes over time but remains throughout the
period. Chinese exports are also less SO2-intensive, and less smoke-intensive,
than Chinese imports during 1995 to 2004, though these divergences are
less dramatic than the water pollution case. Only if pollution intensity is
measured with respect to dust emissions do we find Chinese exports dirtier
than imports.
To understand the relative role of composition and technique eﬀects in
generating these trends in pollution intensity, we conduct a counterfactual
experiment. We recalculate the pollution intensity of both aggregate exports
and aggregate imports, assuming the pollution intensity of sectoral out17. In the very few cases where several Chinese divisions map to a single ISIC four-digit
line, a production-weighted pollution intensity is assigned. As before, production weights are
constructed from the 2004 Chinese four-digit level gross industrial output value data from
China Data Online.
18. The peak in dust emissions intensity is largely due to the inclusion from 1998 onward of
emissions from TVIEs. Because TVIE emissions data are unavailable at the sectoral level, the
yearly industrial pollution intensities in 1995 to 1997 do not include TVIEs.
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Fig. 11.5 The pollution intensity of China’s overall trade and processing trade,
1995–2004
Source: Data calculations by authors, as described in the text.

put remained at its 1995 levels. These counterfactual pollution intensities,
shown by the dashed lines in figure 11.5, represent the change in pollution
intensity of exports (imports) if only the composition of traded products
had changed over time.
For all four pollutants, figure 11.4 shows that changes in the composition
of trade did imply both cleaner exports and imports. However, in every
case, these composition eﬀects account for a relatively small proportion
of the observed changes in the pollution intensity of trade. This suggests
that China’s cleaner production techniques have been the most important
force behind cleaner trade. It should be noted that with pollution intensity
data only available at the Chinese two-digit level, the composition (technique) eﬀect could be understated (overstated) in figure 11.4. A change in
the composition of trade among activities within a division could lead to
lower pollution intensity, but would be misattributed in our data to a technique eﬀect.19 While this is certainly possible, a closer look at the variation
in the trade data suggests that within division changes in the composition
of trade are not likely to be large enough to reverse the result. Interestingly,
Levinson (2009) also finds evidence that technique eﬀects are more important than composition eﬀects in explaining the falling pollution intensity
of U.S. trade.
Because table 11.1 shows a shift in the composition of China’s trade
toward highly fragmented manufacturing sectors, and because table 11.2
19. We are indebted to Arik Levinson for this observation.
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suggests that these sectors are relatively low polluters, we examine more
closely the pollution intensity of processing trade. Because the Chinese
industrial pollution data are not diﬀerentiated by customs regime, the
export- or import-weighted pollution intensities for processing trade diﬀer
from those for overall trade solely due to the composition of products traded
under the processing regime. As figure 11.5 shows, many of the trends in the
pollution intensities for overall trade are also true for processing trade. Processing exports appear to be cleaner than processing imports with respect
to all pollutants. Processing exports and imports also both show downward
trends in pollution intensity during the period. Counterfactual results (not
shown) also suggest that, once again, composition eﬀects are responsible for
a small share of the decline in pollution intensity over time.
However, figure 11.5 also reveals that China’s processing exports are
cleaner than China’s overall exports. The average COD, SO2, and smoke
intensities of processing exports are about 70 percent that of overall exports
in 1995. The dust intensity of processing exports is even lower—only about
50 percent that of overall trade. Though some of these diﬀerences diminish
over time, processing exports continue to have significantly lower pollution
intensities than overall exports across all four pollutants throughout the
period. This evidence is suggestive that the increase in China’s processing
exports has implied a composition eﬀect that is favorable toward China’s
environment. This eﬀect might be further magnified if the firms engaged
in processing trade (largely foreign-invested firms) actually produce with
cleaner techniques than average firms.
11.5

The Role of Fragmentation and FDI in Explaining
the Pollution Intensity of Chinese Trade

To explore the role that production fragmentation and foreign investment play in the changes we observe in the pollution intensity of China’s
trade, we develop a model that embeds China into the global production
network. Our model is tailored for the Chinese context in that it recognizes
the magnitude of foreign investment and its eﬀects on the composition of
trade. The framework we use draws upon the structural model of pollution developed by Copeland and Taylor (1994) and the outsourcing model
developed by Feenstra and Hanson (1996). We first consider the supply of
pollution to identify the determinants of pollution regulation. Next, we
examine the demand for pollution, first considering the pollution intensity
of exports in a simple two-sector model without fragmented production
and then adding a fragmented export sector. We use these models to explore
the impact of foreign investment and trade liberalization on the pollution
content of trade. Our goal is to derive several reduced form models of the
determinants of the pollution intensity of Chinese trade, which we then
test empirically.
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Pollution Supply

We follow Copeland and Taylor (2003) in modeling the supply of pollution as the result of government behavior that maximizes the utility of a
representative citizen:
(1)

V  u(R)  D.

Indirect utility is a function of real income, R, and the level of environmental
damage, D. The government levies a pollution tax, , to induce the utilitymaximizing level of damage, taking as given world prices, trade policy, and
production possibilities. The gross national product (GNP) function gives
the maximum value of national income as a function of domestic prices,
the pollution tax rate, and vector of factor endowments. Consequently, real
income for the representative citizen can be expressed as R  G( p,,)/Lp,
where p is a price index, and L is the number of citizens.20 Maximization
of equation (1) yields the Samuelson rule for public good provision: the
government sets the pollution tax equal to the sum of marginal damages
across all citizens. Marginal damage measures the willingness to pay for
reduced emissions, and it reflects the marginal rate of substitution between
emissions and income. Given the indirect utility function (1), the pollution
tax rate chosen is:
(2)

VD
Lp
  L 

VI
u(R)

where the right-hand side gives the marginal damage from pollution.21 Using
equation (2), we express the endogenous pollution tax as (L, p, R).
11.5.2

Pollution Demand without Production Fragmentation

We begin with the simplest model of production and trade. This model
serves as an alternative to a second model, presented below, that explicitly
incorporates export processing with imported intermediate inputs. We consider a two-sector model of a small, open economy. China is endowed with
capital and eﬀective labor (E), which depends on the human capital of its
labor force: E  A(H)L. The import-competing sector, M, uses eﬀective
labor and capital and it serves as numeraire. Each unit of M produced
releases one unit of pollution emissions.
The export sector produces Good Y using eﬀective labor and capital.
Eﬀective labor may also be used for abatement of the pollution emissions
(D) created in the production process. Following Copeland and Taylor’s
20. Pollution tax revenue is counted in G as a return to D, and it is assumed to be rebated
to citizens lump sum.
21. Because we have adopted a specification in which the marginal disutility of pollution is
constant, the pollution supply curve is horizontal. See Copeland and Taylor (2003) for further
discussion and alternative specifications.
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(2003) form for abatement, we may express the production function for Y
treating emissions as an input:
(3)

Y  (EY1 DY) KY1 ,

where 0
1. The relative domestic price of Y is p  p∗, where 1/ is a
measure of trade frictions, and p∗ is China’s terms of trade. We use equation
(3) to solve for the pollution intensity of export production, eY:
(4)

DY
eY ⬅ 
 .
pY


We use equation (4) to create our first estimating equation for the pollution intensity of Chinese exports. In doing so, we note that the pollution
intensity given by equation (4) depends on the pollution intensity of China’s
export production, as measured by the term, . As Copeland and Taylor
(2003) discuss, diﬀerences across countries in factor abundance interact with
regulatory diﬀerences to determine the pattern of trade. These considerations lead to an expression for the pollution intensity of Chinese exports
of the form:
(5)

eY  eY (K, H, L, )  eY (K, H, L, R, p∗, ).

In this expression we have replaced the pollution tax rate with its determinants, based on equation (2). Thus, the pollution intensity of exports can be
estimated as a function of China’s factor endowments, its real income per
capita, its terms of trade, and its trade frictions.
An increase in China’s overall capital-labor ratio should raise the capital
intensity of both the import-competing and export sectors. If pollution
intensity rises with the capital intensity of production, we would expect
China’s capital-labor ratio to be positively related to the pollution intensity
of both its exports and its imports.22 Because an increase in real income raises
the level of the pollution tax, we expect the pollution intensity of exports to
fall as China’s real income rises. The terms of trade and trade frictions have
ambiguous eﬀects on pollution intensity. Improved terms of trade imply an
increase in real gross domestic product (GDP) and, hence, a higher domestic
pollution tax, reducing e, but a higher relative price for exports raises the
production value of factors used in abatement, raising e. If this latter consideration dominates, we would expect improved terms of trade and reduced
trade frictions to raise the pollution intensity of China’s exports.
11.5.3

Pollution Demand with Production Fragmentation

As an alternative to the simple two-sector model above, we consider a
model with two export sectors. China is treated as a small economy rela22. It is common to assume that pollution intensity rises with the capital intensity of production. Copeland and Taylor (2003) provide some evidence for the case of SO2.
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tive to an advanced trading bloc (A). The first sector produces “ordinary”
exports, those that are produced with domestic inputs, using the production
technology given by equation (3). The “processing” sector produces a set of
goods that are intermediate inputs for a single final good. This final good
is costlessly assembled from a continuum of intermediate inputs, indexed
by z ∈ [0,1]. Inputs are produced using eﬀective labor, capital specific to the
processing sector, and pollution discharge. Input production technology
varies by the amount of labor used relative to the emissions created during
production. We adopt a simple functional form for production technology
of input z:
(6)

x(z)  [E(z)1

(z)

D(z)

(z)

] K(z)1 .

We also restrict (z) ∈[ (z), 苶(z)], 0
1. We assume
苶 1, and 0
苶
苶 pollution-intensive than processing
that ordinary export production
is more
export production, implying that  苶.
Intermediate producers consider the price of labor, capital, and pollution discharge when choosing a production technique. The price of labor,
w, measures the wage per eﬀective labor unit, thereby accounting for labor
quality diﬀerences across countries. The rental price of capital is given by r.
If firms were unregulated, they would always choose to discharge as much
as possible to economize on labor. However, China levies a pollution tax, ,
according to equation (2), and this tax is eﬀective in the sense that firms abate
some pollution. Given these factor prices, the firm’s labor and discharge
combination that satisfies cost minimization is:
(7)

冤

冥

w
1  (z) D(z)
   .

(z)
E(z)

Because equation (7) implies that the parameter (z) determines how pollution discharge varies among intermediates producers, (z) provides a
measure of pollution intensity. We can order the intermediates in order of
decreasing pollution intensity to obtain (z) 0.
To determine the pattern of trade between China and the advanced countries, we examine how unit production costs vary across intermediates. The
unit cost of producing one unit of input x in country i is given by:
(8)

c(wi, i, ri; z)  κ(z)wi[1

(z)]

 i (z) r 1
i ,

where κ(z) is an industry-specific constant. Input z is produced in an
advanced country if c(wA, A, rA; z) c(wC, C, rC ; z).
We assume that labor in the advanced bloc has high human capital levels
and, thus, it is more productive than labor in China. The pollution tax levied
in the advanced countries exceeds the rate set in China, such that wA /A
wC /C . Given these relative factor prices and assuming for the moment that
rental rates are the same in both countries, input z would be produced in
the advanced bloc if
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冢 冣

wA
C
⬅
 
wC
A

(9)

(z)/[1 (z)]

⬅ T(z).

With A  C and (z) 0, T(z) must be increasing in z. The advanced bloc’s
cost advantage increases as the pollution intensity of production decreases.
For a given relative wage rate, , the T(z) locus determines a critical industry
z∗ such that China has lower costs than the advanced bloc in the range of
inputs indexed by z ∈[0, z∗), while the advanced bloc has lower costs in the
range z ∈(z∗, 1].
Now we assume that the rental rate of capital is not the same in both
countries and that instead, rA rC. Because capital’s cost share is the same
across all goods, this rental diﬀerential lowers the cost of production in the
advanced countries across the full range of intermediates. To consider an
equilibrium with some trade in intermediates, we assume that despite its
lower rental rate, the advanced bloc has a cost disadvantage for intermediates more pollution intensive than input z∗, defined as that input for which
c(wA, A, rA; z)  c(wC, C, rC; z). Figure 11.6 shows the minimum cost locus
for China as CC and for the advanced bloc as AA.23 While the slope of each
locus depends on the underlying production functions, it can be shown that
they are upward sloping.
The pollution intensity of this fragmented sector depends on which inputs
China produces; that is, it depends on the value of z∗. Based on the production functions (6), total discharge from the X sector is
z∗

z∗

D  冕 D(z)dz   冕 (z)p(z)x(z)dz.
 0
0

(10)

For simplicity, we assume that demand by the final good producer for each
input is a constant share of total world expenditure and that, as a small country, China has a negligible impact on world income.24 Using this assumption,
p(z)x(z)  ϕ(z)IW, in equation (10) leads to an expression for the pollution
intensity of the fragmented sector:
z∗

(11)

eX  冕

0

z∗
p(z)x(z)
D(z)
 
dz

冕
(z)ϕ(z)IWdz

∗
p(z)x(z) 冕z∗ p(z)x(z)dz
冕z p(z)x(z)dz 0
0
0

Equation (11) allows us to express the pollution intensity of the processing
sector as a function of the capital share of export output (1 – ), the pollution tax, , and the critical value, z∗. When the capital share of processing
exports rises, the average pollution intensity of these exports falls. Similarly,
when the pollution tax rises, the average pollution intensity of processing
exports falls. Last, an increase in the critical value, z∗, reduces the average
23. Feenstra and Hanson (1996) introduce a similar diagram to illustrate the fragmentation
of production between the United States and Mexico.
24. Copeland and Taylor (1994) also assume that budget shares are constant in their model,
but they consider two countries large enough to aﬀect international markets.
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FDI expands range of export processing activities performed in China

pollution intensity of the export processing sector because (z) is a decreasing function of z. It is interesting also to note that an increase in z∗ reduces
the pollution intensity of the inputs imported from the advanced countries
for processing. Thus, when the range of inputs produced in China expands,
the pollution intensity of both processing exports and processing imports
declines.
As discussed above, the critical value, z∗ depends on the cost of intermediates production in China, c(wC, C, rC; z). Therefore, z∗ depends on all
determinants of factor prices for the processing sector. These determinants
are the terms of trade and the level of trade frictions, the determinants of
the pollution tax rate, and all factor endowments. As discussed previously,
foreign investment has been skewed toward those sectors that process and
assembly imported intermediates. Therefore, we separate the capital stock
into domestic (Kd ) and foreign owned capital (K f ), allowing us to express
the pollution intensity of the export processing sector as:
(12)

eX  eX (Kd, K f, H, L, p∗, , R).

The pollution intensity of the whole export bundle is a weighted average of
the pollution intensity of ordinary exports and the pollution intensity of
processing exports. Using equation (5) to express the pollution intensity
of ordinary exports and equation (12) to express the pollution intensity of
processing exports and letting SX denote the share of total exports that are
processing exports, the pollution intensity of China’s trade bundle is:
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e  SY eY  SX eX  eY  SX (eX  eY)  e(Kd, K f, H, L, p∗, , R, SX),

where we have used the fact that SY  SX  1. Because we have assumed that
eX eY , an increase in the processing share of exports obviously reduces
overall export pollution intensity, ceteris paribus.
Foreign capital flows primarily to the export processing sector, reducing its cost of capital. Figure 11.6 can be used to illustrate the eﬀect of
this capital inflow on China’s input competitiveness. At constant wages and
pollution tax, the curve labeled CC shifts down, causing z∗ to rise from z∗1
to z∗2. With the pollution tax unchanged, there is no change in the pollution
intensity of any intermediate. However, the capital inflow pulls labor into the
processing sector, raising its share in exports. Moreover, because China now
produces intermediates that are less pollution-intensive than any it produced
before, the average pollution intensity of China’s processing exports falls.25
Likewise, the pollution intensity of China’s processing imports falls because
China now imports a narrower set of inputs, and this set is, on average,
cleaner than before.
Foreign investment may reduce export pollution intensity through another
channel, which we have not formally modeled, even if we hold the processing
share of exports fixed. Foreign investment often involves the use of new
capital equipment and new production techniques. In particular, investment
from high-regulatory-standard countries may transfer new pollution control
methods to the host country as investors use technology and techniques
that they have developed within the context of stringent pollution regulation.26 If foreign investors bring this sort of “technique eﬀect” with them,
the pollution intensity of China’s exports should be negatively associated
with the level of foreign capital, even when the share of processing exports
is held constant.
11.6

Estimating the Determinants of the Pollution Intensity
of China’s Manufacturing Trade

How well does the previous model of production fragmentation and foreign investment explain the changes in the pollution intensity of Chinese
exports and imports shown in figure 11.4? To find out, we begin with the
simple model expressed in equation (5), in which there is no fragmentation, and FDI plays no distinct role. We then consider the model expressed
25. There will also be feedback eﬀects, which we do not discuss here. First, increased foreign
investment may raise domestic wages, but this wage eﬀect cannot overturn the direct eﬀect
of foreign investment. Second, higher real per capita income implies a higher pollution tax,
reinforcing the direct eﬀect by further reducing pollution intensity.
26. This possibility is consistent with evidence presented in Dean, Lovely, and Wang (2009)
on the location decisions of foreign investors. While provincial variation in pollution taxes
influenced the location of Chinese investors, no eﬀect was found for OECD investors.
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in equation (13), which incorporates both ordinary and fragmented trade.
Last, we allow for the endogeneity of fragmented trade and the explicit
influence of foreign investment.
11.6.1

Econometric Specification

Because the pollution intensity of exports (imports) in figure 11.5 is linear in logs, equation (5) could be estimated by pooling the data on the four
pollutants over the period 1995 to 2004 and adding pollutant-specific fixed
eﬀects and a linear time trend:
ln e jit 
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(where j is exports or imports, i is pollutant, and t is time). However, several diﬃculties arise with this approach. With this small sample of annual
observations, the introduction of four additional variables (fixed eﬀects and
a trend) reduces the degrees of freedom substantially. In addition, recent
literature suggests that there are many unresolved issues in the construction of reliable data on the Chinese capital stock.27 Finally, some of the
macroeconomic explanatory variables in the model may be nonstationary.
An alternative approach that addresses all three concerns is to estimate a
first-diﬀerenced specification of the model in equation (5):
(5)

 ln e itj    1 ln Kit  2 ln Lit 
 5 ln Rit  it,

 ln pit 

3

 ln

4

it

where  indicates first diﬀerence.
Equation (5) is estimated using pooled data on COD, SO2, smoke, and
dust intensity of exports (imports) at the national level, from 1995 to 2004.
After diﬀerencing, this yields a small panel of thirty-six observations. The
estimation method is generalized least squares (GLS) with cross-section
weights to correct for pollutant-specific heteroskedasticity. It might be reasonable to assume that the pollution intensity of trade responds diﬀerently
across pollutants. Unfortunately, the limited sample size prevents us from
using a varying coeﬃcients model to explore this possibility. It might also
be reasonable to assume that there is contemporaneous correlation across
the pollutants in the sample. A change in the environmental regime, or a
technological change that aﬀects several pollutants simultaneously, could
cause error terms to be correlated across pollutants in a given year. To
address this issue, specifications of equation (5) were also estimated using
ordinary least squares (OLS) with panel-corrected cross-section standard
errors (PCSE), which are robust to both cross-section heteroskedasticity and
contemporaneous correlation. A comparison of the results allowed us to
27. See the discussion of published data, previous methods of measurement, and recent
innovations by Holz (2006), and the response by Chow (2006).
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assess the importance of contemporaneous correlation and the robustness
of our results to an alternate estimation method. We found little diﬀerence
in the results and so present only the GLS estimates.28
Most of the explanatory variables are constructed using data from the
World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2007. Trends in the underlying
data are shown in table 11.3. The log diﬀerence in the capital stock is proxied
by gross capital formation (percent of GDP), while the log diﬀerence in the
total labor force and in real GDP per capita are calculated directly from the
data.29 In this simple model, investment is not diﬀerentiated by source nor
labor supply by skill level. The log diﬀerence in relative prices is proxied by
the diﬀerence in China’s net barter terms of trade, where the latter is defined
as the ratio of the export price index to the import price index, measured
relative to the base year 2000. The data used to calculate the log diﬀerence
in tariﬀs are China’s simple average most-favored-nation (MFN) tariﬀs
(ad valorem equivalent) taken from the UNCTAD TRAINS database, via
World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS).30
11.6.2

Estimating the Standard Model

Table 11.4 presents the results of estimation of equation (5) for exports in
column (1). These results support some of the predictions discussed previously. Ignoring the role of processing trade, an increase in the capital-labor
ratio increases the pollution intensity of exports, suggesting that capital
and pollution may be complements in production. Real GDP per capita—
the proxy for stringency in environmental regulations—is negatively related
to the pollution intensity of exports, though the impact is not significant.
Trade liberalization appears to be favorable for China’s environment. A fall
in China’s average tariﬀ is associated with a fall in the pollution intensity of
exports. Because China’s tariﬀs actually fell by about 75 percent during this
period, this suggests that trade reform may have contributed significantly to
China’s cleaner trade. In addition, China’s entrance into the WTO in 2001
also seems to have been associated with a significant reduction in the pollution intensity of China’s exports. Finally, though the impact of a change
in the terms of trade is indeterminate in theory, here an improvement in the
terms of trade is associated with increased pollution intensity of exports.
The parallel results for the pollution intensity of imports are shown in table
11.5, column (1). While the results for trade barriers and entrance into the
WTO are similar to that of exports, the results for other variables are much
weaker.
28. Because of the small sample size, not all specifications could be estimated using PSCE.
Results are available from the authors upon request.
29. Gross domestic product per capita is in constant 2000 U.S. dollars.
30. TRAINS has no Chinese tariﬀ data for 1994 to 1995 or 2002. The simple average MFN
tariﬀ data for 1994 to 1995 (with no ad valorem equivalent [AVE] correction) was taken from
Zhang, Zhang, and Wan (1998), and for 2002 (with no AVE correction) was taken from the
WTO (2006).

1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004

35.9
22.0
16.7
16.6
16.3
16.2
15.2
12.2
10.5
9.6

39.3
37.7
36.0
35.0
34.2
32.8
34.2
35.2
37.8
38.7

Gross
capital
formation
4.9
4.7
4.6
4.3
3.6
3.2
3.3
3.4
3.3
2.8

FDI/GDP
1.1
1.2
1.1
1.0
1.1
1.0
1.0
0.8
0.9
1.1

Labor force
growth
49.5
55.8
54.5
56.8
56.3
54.7
54.4
55.3
55.4
55.6

Processing exports
(% of total exports)

44.2
44.9
49.3
48.9
44.0
40.8
38.3
41.5
39.7
39.6

Processing imports
(% of total imports)

9.26
8.48
7.87
6.55
6.38
7.36
7.25
8.04
8.91
9.02

Growth of real
GDP per capita

Sources: All data except the trade and tariﬀ data are from the World Bank World Development Indicators, 2007. The trade data are from China Customs, and the
tariﬀ data are from the World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS).
Note: FDI  foreign direct investment; GDP  gross domestic product.

101.9
105.9
110.2
110.6
104.1
100.0
100.9
100.5
97.3
91.8

Year

Simple
average tariﬀ

Trends in Chinese trade, investment, and growth

Net barter
terms of trade

Table 11.3

2.03

–1.61
–0.30
5.08
5.05
–6.11

–2.02

0.04∗∗

–0.32
–0.01
0.04∗∗∗
1.37∗∗∗
–0.42∗∗∗

–0.91∗∗

36
0.65
11.71∗∗∗

Gross capital formationb
Domestic investmentb
FDIb
Ratio of FDI to
domestic investmentb
Ratio of skilled to
unskilled laborc
Labor force
Real GDP per capita
Terms of tradec
Average tariﬀ
WTO dummy
Processing exports sharec
Constant

No. of observations
Weighted adjusted R2a
Weighted F-statistica

36
0.65
10.10∗∗∗

–0.01
–1.11∗∗

–0.35∗
–0.04
0.04∗∗∗
1.23∗∗∗
–0.42∗∗∗

0.05∗∗

Coeﬃcient

–1.73
–0.76
4.94
3.85
–5.92
–0.94
–2.25

2.24

t-statistica

(2)
Equation (13)

36
0.36
12.26∗∗∗

–0.54∗
–0.18∗
0.04∗∗∗
0.51
–0.39∗∗∗
–0.08∗∗
–2.25∗∗

0.12∗∗∗

Coeﬃcient

–1.75
–1.80
3.31
0.84
–3.70
–2.15
–2.58

2.68

t-statistica

(3)
Equation (13) IV

36
0.74
13.35∗∗∗

0.75

0.29
–0.34∗∗∗
0.12∗∗∗
0.73∗∗∗
–0.83∗∗∗
–0.02∗∗

0.12∗∗∗
–0.52∗∗∗

Coeﬃcient

1.13
–3.52
5.12
2.40
–5.91
–2.00
1.09

4.34
–3.12

t-statistica

(4)
Equation (13) IV

36
0.74
15.73∗∗∗

–1.33
6.00
4.65
–7.60
–2.25
2.67

–3.90

–0.02∗∗∗
–0.08
0.09∗∗∗
1.24∗∗∗
–0.87∗∗∗
–0.03∗∗
2.18∗∗

–3.27

t-statistica

–0.11∗∗∗

Coeﬃcient

(5)
Equation (13) IV

∗Significant at the 10 percent level.

∗∗Significant at the 5 percent level.

Expressed as diﬀerence between value in period t and period t – 1.
∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level.

c

Expressed as share of GDP.

Eviews output gives weighted adjusted R2 and F-statistics, where the weights adjust for the cross-section weights. Eviews also gives t-statistics rather than z-statistics.

b

a

Notes: Dependent variable is log diﬀerence of pollution intensity of exports. All regressions are generalized least squares with panel-specific weights to correct for pollutant-specific
heteroskedasticity. FDI  foreign direct investment; GDP  gross domestic product; WTO  World Trade Organization.

t-statistica

(1)
Equation (5)

The change in the pollution intensity of China’s exports (variables in log diﬀerence unless otherwise noted)

Coeﬃcient

Table 11.4

–0.06
0.16
4.42
3.62
–3.71

–1.85

–0.01
0.01
0.05∗∗∗
1.22∗∗∗
–0.32∗∗∗

–1.03

36
0.39
4.77∗∗∗

No. of observations
Weighted adjusted R2a
Weighted F-statistica

–3.20
–3.80

–0.04∗∗∗
–2.99∗∗∗
36
0.52
6.32∗∗∗

–1.13
–2.19
5.79
4.18
–5.00

3.34

0.13∗∗∗

–0.26
–0.15∗∗
0.06∗∗∗
1.19∗∗∗
–0.40∗∗∗

t-statistica

Coeﬃcient

(2)
Equation (13)

36
0.49
4.76∗∗∗

–0.06∗∗
–3.63∗∗∗

–0.35
–0.21∗∗
0.06∗∗∗
1.19∗∗∗
–0.43∗∗∗

0.16∗∗∗

Coeﬃcient

–2.38
–3.01

–1.32
–2.02
5.12
4.05
–4.40

2.69

t-statistica

(3)
Equation (13) IV

36
0.51
5.54∗∗∗

–0.06∗∗
–4.66∗∗∗

–0.66
–0.08
0.03
1.38∗∗∗
–0.24

0.14∗∗∗
0.43

Coeﬃcient

–2.28
–1.90

–1.08
–0.67
0.63
3.59
–0.98

3.32
1.01

t-statistica

(4)
Equation (13) IV

32
0.48
5.11∗∗∗

–0.03∗∗
8.66∗∗

–2.13
2.61

–2.73
3.71
–2.58
–3.32

3.04

0.13∗∗∗
–0.93∗∗
0.05∗∗∗
–5.09∗∗
–2.62∗∗∗

–2.37

t-statistica

–0.21∗∗∗

Coeﬃcient

(5)
Equation (13) IV

c

Expressed as diﬀerence between value in period t and period t – 1.

Expressed as share of GDP.

Eviews output gives weighted adjusted R2 and F-statistics, where the weights adjust for the cross-section weights. Eviews also gives t-statistics rather than z-statistics.

b

a

Notes: Dependent variable is log diﬀerence of pollution intensity of imports. All regressions are generalized least squares with panel-specific weights to correct for pollutant-specific
heteroskedasticity. FDI  foreign direct investment; GDP  gross domestic product; WTO  World Trade Organization.

1.19

t-statistica

0.03

Coeﬃcient

(1)
Equation (5)

The change in the pollution intensity of China’s imports (variables in log diﬀerence unless otherwise noted)

Gross capital formationb
Domestic investmentb
FDIb
Ratio of FDI to
domestic investment
(lagged)b
Ratio of skilled to
unskilled labor
(lagged)c
Labor force
Real GDP per capita
Terms of tradec
Average tariﬀ
WTO dummy
Processing imports share
(lagged)c
Constant

Table 11.5
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Composition Eﬀects and Fragmentation

Moving beyond the simple model, we incorporate both ordinary and fragmented exports, as in the reduced form model in equation (13). This model
suggests that changes in overall pollution intensity will be explained not
only by the changing pollution intensity of ordinary exports, as in equation (5), but by growth in the share of fragmented exports and changes
in that subsector’s pollution intensity. The share of exports (imports) that
are fragmented is proxied by the share of processing exports (imports) in
total exports (imports). This variable is calculated directly from the trade
data from China Customs; it includes both exports (imports) designated as
processing and assembly, and those designated as processing with imported
materials. We begin by treating the processing share as exogenous and simply
add the change in this share to equation (5) to form equation (13).
(13)

 ln e itj    1 ln Kit  2 ln Lit 
 5 ln Rit  6SXit  υit

 ln pit 

3

 ln

4

it

The results of estimating equation (13) (column [2] of table 11.4) show
weak support for the idea that increased fragmentation has reduced the pollution intensity of China’s exports. An increase in the share of processing
exports by a percentage point reduces the pollution intensity of China’s
exports by about 0.01 percent. The share of processing exports actually
grew by about 6 percent during this time period, implying a larger impact
than the small elasticity might suggest. However, in this specification, the
estimate is not significant. The inclusion of the export processing share also
strengthens the magnitude and significance of factor endowments and real
GDP per capita in explaining the pollution intensity of exports over time.
The parallel results for imports (table 11.5, column [2]) are even more striking. The impact of an increase in the lagged share of processing imports on
the pollution intensity of China’s imports is much larger and more significant (compare tables 11.4 and 11.5, column [2]). In addition, the inclusion
of the lagged import processing share also dramatically strengthens the significance of all other explanatory variables (compare table 11.5, columns
[1] and [2]).
However, the size of the fragmented sector is most likely endogenous.
Clearly changes in trade frictions and factor endowments influence the size of
the processing export share. Trade barriers on imports in highly fragmented
sectors have fallen over this time period.31 China’s entrance into the WTO
has also meant more favorable access for China’s ordinary and fragmented
31. For example, the WTO (2006) reports that average tariﬀs on electronic and communications equipment imports fell with accession to the WTO. In April, 2003 China joined the
WTO Information Technology Agreement, and 258 tariﬀ lines at the HS eight-digit level
became subject to zero tariﬀs. Import licenses and quotas on certain products have also been
removed.
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exports in other WTO members’ markets. As discussed above, growth in
foreign investment is predicted to raise the processing share of exports. Similarly, if export processing is more human-capital-intensive than ordinary
export processing, growth in the relative supply of human capital will raise
the share of resources devoted to export processing.
To account for this endogeneity, we reestimate equation (13) using instrumental variables. The instruments for growth in the processing export share
include all other variables in the equation and the growth in the processing
import share. Because by law, goods imported under the processing regime
can only be used for production of processing exports, growth in the share
of processing imports should be a good predictor of growth in the share
of processing exports, while being uncorrelated with the dependent variable. The instrumented results (column [3] of table 11.4) now show much
stronger evidence that growth in the share of fragmented exports leads to
cleaner exports. The elasticity of pollution intensity with respect to processing export share is much larger and is now highly significant. The role
of factor endowments in strengthened by the instrumental variable (IV)
estimation and growth in real GDP per capita now significantly reduces the
pollution intensity of exports.
Table 11.5, column (3) shows the IV estimation for imports. In this case,
the instruments include all other variables in the equation and the share of
processing exports lagged two periods. The IV estimates are generally larger
than those that ignored endogeneity, but otherwise simply reinforce the role
of fragmentation found in column (2).
11.6.4

Composition Eﬀects, Technique Eﬀects, and FDI

Thus far, we have not distinguished investment by source nor labor by
skill. Yet FDI plays a crucial role in fragmented trade. As argued above, an
increase in FDI flows should reduce pollution intensity by increasing the
share of processing exports and by increasing the critical value, z∗. Domestic capital, in contrast, flows primarily to the import-competing and ordinary export sectors. Thus, an increase in domestically sourced investment
pulls factors out of the export-processing sector, reducing the critical value
z∗, and increasing the average pollution intensity of the export-processing
sector.32 Production shifts to the more highly polluting ordinary-export
sector. Therefore, we expect that an increase in domestic investment raises
the pollution intensity of China’s exports.
An increase in the relative supply of human capital acts, in the model, like
a decrease in the Chinese eﬀective wage. A decrease in w shifts the CC line
down in figure 11.6, allowing China to compete successfully in production
of more human-capital-intensive intermediate inputs. Thus, an increase in
32. The CC line in figure 11.6 shifts up when labor is pulled out of the sector and wages
rise.
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Chinese human capital is predicted to reduce the pollution intensity of China’s exports. An increase in unskilled labor, on the other hand, is predicted
to have the opposite eﬀect.
The last two columns of table 10.4 show evidence that is certainly suggestive of the important role that increased FDI and increased human
capital play in making Chinese exports cleaner. In column (4) of table
11.4, we present results for the instrumented estimation of equation (13)
again, but with investment split between domestically sourced investment
and FDI. FDI (percent of GDP) is taken from the World Development
Indicators.33 Domestically-sourced investment (as a share of GDP) is
calculated as the diﬀerence between gross capital formation and FDI. It
is immediately evident that these two types of investment have opposite
eﬀects. As expected, increased FDI flows strongly reduce the pollution
intensity of Chinese trade, while increased domestically sourced investment does the opposite. Because the eﬀects of FDI flows on the size of
the fragmented sector are captured via the IV estimation, the coeﬃcient
on the FDI variable actually suggests evidence of cleaner exports due to
a change in composition within the fragmented sector (an increase in z∗).
It may also suggest that foreign investors bring greener technologies than
their local counterparts, implying an additional favorable technique eﬀect.
Parallel results for imports (table 11.5, column [4]) are much weaker and
show no such role for FDI.
Because of the small sample size, we are unable to test for distinct roles
of investment by source and labor by skill simultaneously. However, some
evidence suggestive of the importance of both is shown in column (5) of
table 11.4. In this final regression, we include the ratio of FDI to domestically sourced investment as well as growth in the ratio of skilled to unskilled
labor. The latter is proxied by the share of the population with at least senior
secondary education, relative to the illiterate share.34 The results in column
(5) of table 11.5 suggest that the pollution intensity of exports is strongly
reduced by the relative growth of foreign investment and of skilled labor.
This evidence is consistent with the notion that increased FDI flows expands
the composition of fragmented exports to include cleaner intermediates and
that more skill-intensive intermediates are cleaner. While the theory would
suggest both these attributes should be true of imports as well, only the FDI
results are borne out in table 11.5 (column [5]).35
33. These data closely parallel oﬃcial Chinese data on utilized (or realized) FDI flows (percent GDP; see Annual FDI Statistics, www.fdi.gov.cn).
34. Data on shares of population aged  six years by educational attainment are from various
issues of the China Statistical Yearbook. Data for the year 1995 are from Cao (2000, 4).
35. The results for the impact of the ratio of skilled to unskilled labor on the pollution
intensity of imports appear to be highly sensitive to the lag chosen. More data are required to
determine how illustrative they really are.
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Global Engagement and the Environment

By all accounts, China’s rapid economic growth over the past twenty years
has been accompanied by severe environmental degradation. While much
of this deterioration can be attributed to growth in domestic consumption,
the extent to which China’s environment has been sacrificed so that it can
serve as “the world’s factory” is an important economic and moral question.
To begin to address this issue, this paper provides new evidence on trends in
industrial pollution intensity, changes in the pollution intensity of Chinese
trade, and the influence of foreign investment and production fragmentation
on the pollution content of Chinese exports and imports. Contrary to the
expectations of many commentators, we find that deeper global engagement
has reduced the implicit environmental cost of Chinese income growth.
Using oﬃcial Chinese environmental data on air and water pollution from
MEP, we find that industrial emissions of primary pollutants have slowed
or fallen over the last decade while trade has grown. Relative to 1995 levels,
real manufacturing trade increased almost 300 percent by 2005, while annual
industrial emissions of COD, smoke, and dust declined by 56 percent, 46
percent, and 40 percent. Industrial emissions of SO2 rose only after 1999, but
were 17.5 percent higher than 1995 levels by 2005. As noted by Naughton
(2007, 495), the abatement of waste from large factories has been a relatively
positive part of China’s environmental record and the stabilization of waste
while output has grown sharply represents a significant achievement in its
development.
Using emissions data compiled from Chinese Environment Yearbooks, we
present new evidence on the pollution intensity of Chinese industrial production. Tracking changes in these pollution intensities over time reveals
surprising trends. Across all four pollutants, we find that the pollution intensity of almost all sectors has fallen since 1995. This finding suggests that
China has benefited from a positive “technique eﬀect,” as emissions per real
dollar of output have fallen across a wide range of industries. Suggestively, a
review of trends in Chinese trade patterns reveals that China’s trade appears
to be shifting toward relatively cleaner sectors over time. In particular, the
share of exports accounted for by textiles and leather products has fallen,
while the share accounted for by oﬃce and computing and communications
equipment has grown dramatically. These growth sectors are characterized
by low air and water pollution intensities and by high shares of processing
trade, indicating the substantial presence of two-way trade in production
“fragments.”
Linking the industrial pollution intensities to detailed trade statistics from
China Customs yields a weighted average pollution intensity for China’s
manufacturing exports (imports) for each year in the period 1995 to 2005.
Contrary to popular expectations, which emphasize the migration of dirty
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industries to poor nations, we find that Chinese exports are less waterpollution intensive and generally less air-pollution intensive than Chinese
imports would be if produced domestically. Moreover, both Chinese exports
and imports are becoming cleaner over time. Holding the pollution intensity
of production constant in a counterfactual experiment, we find that changes
in the composition of trade over the decade account for some of the trend
toward cleaner trade, although a substantial share of the decline remains
attributed to changes in production techniques. Finally, we find that processing trade is cleaner than ordinary trade.
The weight of this evidence suggests that the increased concentration of
Chinese trade in highly fragmented industries has led to composition and
technique eﬀects that are favorable toward China’s environment. Drawing
on Copeland and Taylor (1994), we present a simple model of production
and trade that leads to a reduced form equation for the pollution intensity of Chinese trade. Explicitly incorporating a role for fragmented trade
yields a set of key determinants of the pollution intensity of trade: Chinese
domestic factor endowments, foreign investment, the terms of trade, trade
frictions, per capita real income, and the share of trade in fragmented sectors
where this share is also influenced by the other key determinants. In theory,
increased FDI inflows not only increase the size of the fragmented sector
but also reduce its average pollution intensity.
Econometric evidence from instrumental variables estimation strongly
supports the role of processing trade in explaining the drop in the pollution intensity of Chinese exports and imports over time. This suggests that
there is indeed a favorable composition eﬀect generated by the increased
importance of fragmentation in Chinese trade. The evidence also suggests
that, controlling for the size of processing exports, FDI inflows contribute to
cleaner exports. This supports the idea that increased FDI may change the
composition of the fragmented sector itself toward relatively cleaner intermediate goods and may also bring greener technology to the fragmented
sector.
In the Five-Year Plan for 2006 to 2010, the Chinese authorities call for a
reorientation of their economic growth model toward environmental sustainability. How China will achieve the dual goal of economic growth and
reduced environmental degradation is far from clear. Trade and foreign
investment has fueled much of China’s trade boom, and so it is natural to
ask whether China’s unique brand of global engagement needs to be radically altered to move its development path in the desired direction. The new
data analyzed in this paper suggests that, at least provisionally, the answer to
this question is no. Industrial pollution intensity has already stabilized and,
in many industries, has begun to decline. Looking specifically at the bundle
of goods China trades with the world, we find that, contrary to what might
have been expected, foreign investment and integration into global production networks has reduced the environmental cost of China’s growth.
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Appendix
Construction of the Pollution Intensities of Chinese
Manufacturing Industries, 1995–2004
Data on emissions of COD, SO2, smoke, and dust, as well as the current
value of output of the sampled enterprises at the industry level, were compiled by the authors from the Chinese Environmental Yearbooks (Chinese
editions) and the China Statistical Yearbook on Environment (dual language,
2000, 2005, and 2006). Emissions data are originally in tons and output
in 1,000 current yuan. They are available by the two-digit “divisions” in
the Chinese industrial classification system for the industrial sector, which
includes Mining (six divisions); Manufacturing (thirty divisions); and Distribution of Electricity, Water, and Gas (three divisions). Pollution intensities
were calculated as emissions (in kilos) per thousand real yuan (1995 yuan).
Output was deflated using the manufacturing producer price index (China
Statistical Yearbook, various issues). These pollution intensities are shown
for Manufacturing and for the Distribution of Electricity, Water, and Gas
by division (GB/T 4754-2002), in table 11A.1.
Change in Chinese Industrial Classifications
Prior to 2003, Chinese industrial data were classified using GB/T 47541994. From 2003 onward, industrial data are classified using GB/T 47542002. In both classifications, manufacturing has thirty two-digit “divisions.”
Using the oﬃcial Chinese concordance, we compared the two classifications
and found only two changes in manufacturing divisions.36 First, the 1994
division 39 (weapons and ammunition mfg.) became part of 2002 division
36 (special equipment mfg.).37 We address this change under aggregation
issues in the following. Second, the 2002 division 43 (waste recycling) was
added. This division was not part of manufacturing in the previous period.
Therefore, we dropped it from the analysis.
Aggregation and Missing Data
In the published emissions and output data from 1995 to 2000, several
divisions are aggregated together. Divisions 13 to 16 are grouped as “Food,
Beverages and Tobacco,” divisions 35 to 41 are grouped as “Machine, Electric Machinery & Electronic Equipment Mfg.,” and divisions 44 to 46 are
grouped as “Production and Supply of Electric Power, Gas, and Water.” To
disaggregate these grouped data, we first created corresponding groups for
36. The four-digit “classes” within each two-digit division remained essentially unchanged.
There were fewer classes in total in the 2002 classification, largely due to merges of classes
within the same division.
37. The remaining 2002 division codes were renumbered accordingly. Thus, 1994 division 40
corresponds to 2002 division 39, 1994 division 41 corresponds to 2002 division 40, and so on.

2.43
2.47
3.38
0.28
1.53
0.56
0.74
3.83
1.07
7.08
0.64
2.85
5.08
1.71
2.34
1.77
0.79
10.73
4.63
8.01
1.02

13.30
7.65
9.57
0.20
1.07
0.31
2.57
6.08
0.94
70.02
0.18
0.79
3.07
3.51
3.42
0.33
0.10
0.36
1.05
0.24
0.11

13 Agricultural and sideline foods processing
14 Food production
15 Beverage production
16 Tobacco products processing
17 Textile industry
18 Clothes, shoes, and hat manufacture
19 Leather, furs, down, and related products
20 Timber processing, bamboo, cane, palm fiber, and straw products
21 Furniture manufacturing
22 Papermaking and paper products
23 Printing and record medium reproduction
24 Cultural, educational, and sports articles production
25 Petroleum processing, coking, and nuclear fuel processing
26 Raw chemical material and chemical products
27 Medical and pharmaceutical products
28 Chemical fiber
29 Rubber products
30 Plastic products
31 Nonmetal mineral products
32 Smelting and pressing of ferrous metals
33 Smelting and pressing of nonferrous metals
34 Metal products

SO2

COD

1.67
2.77
0.99
1.33
0.82
0.31
6.59
2.25
1.87
0.65

2.29
1.09
2.40
0.10
0.84
0.31
0.47
5.12
1.25
4.80
0.32

Smoke

1995

1.15
0.78
0.02
0.17
0.15
0.01
40.26
5.56
1.49
0.07

0.23
0.08
0.07
0.03
0.03
0.01
0.03
2.91
0.54
0.63
0.00

Dust
1.87
1.10
1.26
0.02
0.74
0.33
0.87
1.02
0.14
7.22
0.08
0.09
0.08
0.65
0.72
0.69
0.08
0.11
0.14
0.14
0.09
0.08

COD

0.55
0.62
0.72
0.05
0.72
0.29
0.22
1.28
0.22
1.90
0.09
0.31
0.85
1.34
0.45
0.89
0.41
0.20
4.33
0.98
2.20
0.17

SO2

Pollution intensity of Chinese industrial output, 1995 and 2004, by industry (Chinese classification GB/T 4754-2002)

Division

Table 11A.1

0.77
0.38
0.61
0.03
0.28
0.14
0.17
1.55
0.16
1.11
0.07
0.18
0.58
0.66
0.22
0.28
0.18
0.08
3.29
0.47
0.63
0.09

Smoke

2004

0.06
0.02
0.02
0.01
0.03
0.02
0.00
0.64
0.01
0.07
0.00
0.29
0.19
0.22
0.01
0.02
0.00
0.07
14.29
1.05
0.59
0.05

Dust

0.78
0.72
0.37
0.31
0.23
0.08

59.25
7.77
1.67

0.97
0.98
0.43
0.54
0.35
0.24

95.80
9.69
2.79

0.26
7.20
0.45

0.01
0.00

0.13
0.10
0.10
0.02

Notes: Values are in kilos per thousand yuan output in 1995 constant yuan. COD  chemical oxygen demand.

35 Ordinary machinery manufacturing
0.11
36 Special equipment manufacturing
0.21
37 Transport equipment manufacturing
0.12
39 Electric machines and apparatuses manufacturing
0.13
40 Communications equipment, computer and other electronic equipment
manufacturing
0.08
41 Instruments, meters, cultural and oﬃce machinery manufacture
0.11
42 Craftwork and other manufactures
43 Waste resources and old material recycling and processing
44 Electricity and heating production and supply
1.45
45 Fuel gas production and supply
2.47
46 Water production and supply
12.33
0.03
0.05
0.09
0.03
0.24
0.75
2.08

0.06
0.07
0.06
0.02
0.03
0.07
0.13
0.08
20.44
1.84
0.92

0.22
0.17
0.06
0.04
0.03
0.01
0.08
0.05
7.16
0.80
0.34

0.14
0.08
0.07
0.03

0.01
0.00
0.09
0.02
0.16
0.52
0.00

0.09
0.03
0.06
0.02

466

Judith M. Dean and Mary E. Lovely

the years 2001 to 2004 by summing the appropriate division data. For each
group, we calculated the average share of emissions of each pollutant attributable to each division within the group. We then applied these shares to the
recorded group data in the earlier period. The group’s annual emissions data
from 1995 to 2000 for each pollutant was multiplied by the corresponding
average share to derive the missing annual emissions data for each division
within that group. We followed a similar procedure to derive the missing
output data for each division within each group.
For example, during 2001 to 2004, Food Production (14) was responsible
on average, for about 16 percent of annual COD emissions and about 17
percent of annual output of “Food, Beverages and Tobacco.” Therefore,
for each year during 1995 to 2000, 16 percent of the recorded COD emissions and 17 percent of the recorded output for that group were allocated
to Food Production.
This method assumes that the 2001 to 2004 relative trends in emissions of
each pollutant and in output across divisions within a group apply during
the earlier period. This is certainly plausible. However, it could mask any
radical changes in technique or in composition within a group that took
place in a single year.
Emissions and output data for five divisions during the 1995 to 2000
period are missing: Clothes, Shoes and Hat Manufacture (18), Timber Processing, etc. (20), Furniture Manufacturing (21), Cultural, Educational and
Sports Articles (24), and Craftwork and Other (42). To fill in the missing
data for the first three, we paired each missing division with a related division
for which complete data were available: (18) with (17) textiles; (20) with (22)
papermaking and paper products; (21) with (22). For each pair, we calculated the average ratio of emissions of each pollutant for the missing division
relative to the complete division during 2001 to 2004. These ratios were then
applied to the recorded data for the complete division in the earlier period.
For each year of 1995 to 2000, we multiplied the complete division’s data
by these average emissions ratios to derive the annual emissions data for the
missing division in that pair. We then followed a similar procedure to derive
the output data for the missing division.
For example, during 2001 to 2004, we found that the ratio of COD emissions for Clothes (18) relative to Textiles (17) averaged about 3.3 percent,
while the ratio of SO2 emissions averaged about 4.1 percent. Therefore, for
each year during 1995 to 2000, we assigned values for division (18) COD
and SO2 emissions that were 3.3 percent and 4.1 percent, respectively, of the
recorded data for division (17).
We were unable to find a related division to pair with (24) or (42). Therefore,
these data are missing during 1995 to 2000.38 These missing data essentially
38. These two divisions together account for only about 6 percent of manufacturing exports
in 1995 and about 4 percent in 2000.
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impact our estimates of the pollution intensity of ISIC 36 (Furniture and
other manufacturing, not elsewhere specified). Division (24) maps almost
exclusively to ISIC 36. The classes in division (42) map to several two-digit
ISIC categories, but mostly to ISIC 36. These two divisions accounted for 76
percent (47 percent and 29 percent, respectively, of ISIC 36 exports in 1995,
but declined in importance over the period. By 2000, they accounted for only
57 percent (45 percent and 12 percent, respectively), while furniture’s share
had roughly doubled (11 percent to 19 percent). Thus, while the pollution
intensity of exports of ISIC 36 in our analysis during 1995 to 2000 is based
nearly exclusively on the pollution intensity of furniture production, any
bias this may introduce diminishes over these five years.39
Emissions from Township and Village-Level Enterprises (TVIEs)
Emissions data prior to 1998 were recorded only for industrial enterprises at the “county level and above.” After the Investigation on Sources of
Township Industrial Pollution (1997), it was found that township and village
industrial enterprises (TVIEs) were accounting for a significant and growing percentage of emissions. Therefore, the emissions data included these
enterprises from 1998 onward. Because TVIE emissions data are unavailable
at the sectoral level, the yearly industrial pollution intensities in 1995 to 1997
do not include TVIEs. Thus, the values for 1995 in table 11A.1 and in table
11.2 are likely to be understated.
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Comment

Arik Levinson

Dean and Lovely’s chapter makes an important and interesting contribution to our understanding of the relationship between international trade
and pollution. Many observers argue that developed countries, such as the
United States, have improved their environments in recent decades largely
by outsourcing pollution-intensive production to developing countries, such
as China.1 If that is the case, U.S. imports and Chinese exports should be
increasingly composed of pollution-intensive goods. Economists have now
refuted that idea, from the U.S. perspective, by showing that the composition
of U.S. imports has become less pollution-intensive over time, not more.2
Dean and Lovely are the first I know of to examine the converse. They show
that the composition of exports from China has been shifting toward cleaner
goods, not dirtier.
The result nicely complements existing evidence from the U.S. perspective
and is, therefore, both important and believable. However, the analysis contains two unavoidable biases that unfortunately work in favor of that result,
making the composition of China’s exports appear spuriously cleaner. Dean
and Lovely acknowledge both biases clearly in their chapter and explain
convincingly that they have exhausted all possibilities for ameliorating those
biases given the available data. It is, therefore, worth taking a few moments
here to demonstrate with the U.S. data just how large those biases can be.
The first bias involves industry aggregation. Dean and Lovely calculate
emissions intensities (pollution per thousand yuan of output) for each of
thirty-three sectors, listed in their appendix table 11A.1. They then conduct
a counterfactual thought experiment, constructing the aggregate pollu-
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1. See, for example, Jane Spencer, “Why China Could Blame Its CO2 on West,” Wall Street
Journal, November 12, 2007, A.2.
2. In addition to work cited by Dean and Lovely, see Kahn (2003), Cole (2004), and GamperRabindran (2006).

